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The magician's trick is to divert the eye of the audience away
from the action. I always fall for it when someone is pulling a rabbit
out of a hat, but I have not been tricked by the latest O'Connell-
Joost "freedom to choose" no-fault plan.' (I will hereafter refer to
this as the OJ plan.)
I could spend a number of pages uncovering the lurking legisla-
tive, administrative, and constitutional pitfalls in the proposal, but I
am not going to do that. Instead, I will briefly demonstrate why I
think presenting this plan in the guise of freedom of choice is some-
thing of a charlatan's trick that would not fool most lawyers and
judges. I will then present some different approaches for solving the
problem O'Connell and Joost want solved.
What O'Connell and Joost want to do and how they want to do it
are plain enough. Their goal is to reduce automobile insurance rates
and the method is to eliminate noneconomic damages. They doubt-
less anticipate that direct attempts to take away or cap noneconomic
damages, to the extent needed to achieve their goal, would be
doomed to political or constitutional failure.2 They are keenly aware
that few standard "threshold" no-fault' states have adopted high
enough levels of no-fault personal injury protection (PIP) b6nefits
* Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. B.S. 1957, Duke Univer-
sity; M.S. 1961, Worcester Polytechnic Institute; J.D. 1963, University of Michigan.
1. See generally O'Connell & Joost, Giving Motorists A Choice Between Fault
and No-Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. Rav. 61 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
3. By this I mean a noneconomic damage threshold based upon the original Kee-
ton-O'Connell plan such as the one now in effect in Florida. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 627.730-.7405 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989).
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and tort suit thresholds to achieve their purposes.4 Stymied by those
realities, they have made a bold attempt to borrow from the modish
freedom of choice ideology in an attempt to lure the populace "to
choose" to give up the right to sue for noneconomic losses (and
maybe a lot of economic losses, too). Like the magician, they at-
tempt to focus the readers' attention on what they are "getting"
while diverting it from what they are giving up.
Here is the OJ plan. Everyone must choose to purchase either no-
fault (NF) or tort (Tort) insurance. (Incidentally, you, sub silentio,
are deprived of the choice of buying no insurance.) If you purchase
NF, your NF policy sets the limit of your entitlement and you may
bring no action in tort. To be definite, you retain no tort rights, not
for economic losses in excess of your policy coverage, and not for
noneconomic damages under any circumstances. Hence, if you buy,
say, $20,000 in no-fault benefits and a negligent driver injures you to
the extent of $100,000, you get your $20,000 policy limit and have
no right to sue the tortfeasor. By the same token, the NF purchaser
acquires immunity against negligence actions brought by others.
Hence, if the tortfeasor in my first example was also a NF insured,
he would enjoy total immunity for the harm done, including the
amount exceeding the injured person's NF benefits.
If, instead, you purchase tort insurance, you get no NF benefits
and your right to sue remains unimpaired as to other Tort purchas-
ers. Similarly, as to them, you have no immunity for your own negli-
gence, but would be indemnified by your Tort insurer. (The descrip-
tion of the plan breaks down as to whether the immunity applies to
losses that exceed the limits of the Tort coverage.5) By contrast,
when a Tort purchaser collides with a NF purchaser, mutual immu-
nities prevent either party from maintaining a tort action against the
other. Nevertheless, as a reward for the choosing to purchase Tort
insurance, the Tort purchaser is permitted to bring an "inverse lia-
bility" tort action against his inverse liability insurer as an ersatz for
the real tortfeasor. In effect, the injured party sues himself. In what
may be a mildly disquieting revelation, the Tort purchaser will soon
discover he also paid the inverse liability carrier to defend the action.
What the Tort purchaser gets as his choice, then, is immunity
against actions brought by NF purchasers and the right to buy as
much uninsured motorist coverage as he pleases, which coverage
treats a NF purchaser as an uninsured motorist. He also gets to sue
other negligent Tort purchasers and likewise has no immunity
against them6 (subject to the authors' vagueness as to whether in-
4. See O'Connell & Joost, supra note 1, at 62-65.
5. See generally O'Connell & Joost, supra note 1, at 77-82.
6. The authors are vague on this, but to make sense the plan should supply immu-
nity for damages in excess of the limits of the liability coverage purchased. If the plain-
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sureds, NF or Tort, are immune as to damages exceeding the respec-
tive liability and inverse liability limits).
The first trick outcome here is the abolition of noneconomic dam-
ages simpliciter as to NF purchasers and the severe capping of
noneconomic damages as to Tort purchasers. In fact, the actual limit
on Tort purchasers' rights to recbver noneconomic damages would be
unpredictable in advance of a crash. If the Tort purchaser were to be
injured by a NF purchaser (or were to suffer a single vehicle colli-
sion), the amount of recoverable noneconomic damages would be set
by the policy limit of inverse liability insurance coverage reduced by
the amount of economic damages suffered. If the Tort purchaser
were to be injured by another Tort purchaser, the limit would be the
higher of the defendant's liability coverage or the plaintiff's inverse
liability coverage (also reduced by the amount of economic
damages).
The second trick outcome is the abolition of economic damages as
to NF purchasers to the extent they exceed the plaintiff's NF cover-
age, and the abolition of economic damages as to Tort purchasers to
the extent they exceed the higher of the liability coverage (if any) of
a defendant or the inverse liability coverage of a plaintiff. In sum,
the freedom of choice plan not only does away with noneconomic
damages for all intents and purposes, but it caps economic damages
as well.
The purpose behind all this is to lower automobile liability insur-
ance prices, and I do not doubt it would do so, at least in the short
run. I also believe that the true costs of uncovered economic losses
would be reintroduced into the insurance system in the long run, but
I will not speculate where. What I will speculate about is the true
nature of the choices the OJ freedom to choose plan offers. I will
take current Florida law as the base line. The Florida no-fault stat-
ute requires all motorists (with exceptions that need not concern us)
to purchase no-fault PIP benefits in the amount of $10,000, gives
immunity as to PIP benefits payable under any policy, and gives im-
munity to no-fault purchasers as to noneconomic damages so long as
a prescribed threshold is not exceeded.7 Otherwise, Florida law does
tiffs inverse liability coverage was greater, the excess would be covered up to that limit
under the plaintiff's policy. This means, of course, that every case in which the plaintiff's
inverse liability coverage exceeded the defendant's liability coverage would have two de-
fendants defending the same claim: the true tortfeasor and the plaintiff's inverse liability
carrier.
7. The noneconomic threshold in the Florida plan is prescribed as follows:
(2) In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or
1019
not limit the common law actions to recover all economic and
noneconomic damages caused by a negligent tortfeasor.
How would the OJ plan affect people in Florida? O'Connell and
Joost figure that well-off folks, such as I, would buy Tort inverse
liability coverage up to the limit satisfying our perceived needs to be
secure against a catastrophe. Hence, I would buy coverage limits of
between one and five million dollars. In doing so, I would likewise be
buying liability coverage in the same amount as to all the rest of the
world. In addition, to cover myself, the occupants of my car, and my
family in other cars, against my own negligence (and the like), I
would buy at least as much first party insurance as my PIP and
other first party coverages now afford. In short, I would not tolerate
a reduction in the total amount of automobile insurance coverages
that are now in place from all sources (i.e., my own PIP, other first
party and uninsured motorist's coverages, plus other people's liability
and self-insurance coverages) to protect me and my family. Never-
theless, the authors of the OJ plan figure that this entire package
will come cheaper than my present package of coverages, because
they are betting that most people will choose to purchase NF cover-
age which, concomitantly, makes me immune to any potential liabil-
ity as to them. If they are correct, my rates may indeed go down and
the only thing I will have lost is the potential of a huge recovery
(i.e., more than my one to five million dollars inverse liability cover-
age) against a very deep pocket. The risk of that is minuscule, but
because I would worry about it, I would probably buy more inverse
liability coverage, say, up to ten million dollars. In any event, the OJ
plan may actually reduce my insurance rates to some degree while I
occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as
required by §§ 627.730-627.7405, or against any person or organization legally
responsible for his acts or omissions, a plaintiff may recover damages in tort for
pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience because of bodily injury,
sickness, or disease arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, or use
of such motor vehicle only in the event that the injury or disease consists in
whole or in part of:
(a) Significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function.
(b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability,
other than scarring or disfigurement.
(c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement.
(d) Death.
(3) When a defendant, in a proceeding brought pursuant to §§ 627.730-
627.7405, questions whether the plaintiff has met the requirements of subsec-
tion (2), then the defendant may file an appropriate motion with the court, and
the court shall, on a one-time basis only, 30 days before the date set for the
trial or the pretrial hearing, whichever is first, by examining the pleadings and
the evidence before it, ascertain whether the plaintiff will be able to submit
some evidence that the plaintiff will meet the requirements of subsection (2). If
the court finds that the plaintiff will not be able to submit such evidence, then
the court shall dismiss the plaintiff's claim without prejudice.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989).
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remain as well covered as I now am for both first party benefits and
third party entitlements, including both economic and noneconomic
damages.
But what of the NF purchasers? O'Connell and Joost figure that
most poor people and many of the vast middle class who get by, but
only by pinching pennies, will opt for NF coverage. Under the OJ
plan this coverage must have "a high established limit on benefits." 8
I presume that this means something substantially higher than the
$10,000 in PIP benefits Florida now requires (perhaps the New York
limit of $50,000); hence, the vast crowd of NF purchasers will see
their no-fault premiums rise, perhaps dramatically. O'Connell and
Joost would respond to this revelation in two ways. First, the NF
purchasers would be getting substantially more no-fault coverage,
which is true and to the good. And, second, they would be choosing
to be immune to tort liability and, consequently, might drop any lia-
bility insurance they had been purchasing.
To the latter point, I have two serious rejoinders. Florida does not
presently require liability coverage except for those folks who run
afoul of the financial responsibility law. 10 Probably it should, but it
does not. In the meantime, poor people have little reason to purchase
liability insurance because they have little to lose. If they have some-
thing worth protecting, it is most likely their homes, which the Flor-
ida law already zealously guards against creditors."' In short, the
8. O'Connell & Joost, supra note 1, at 81.
9. O'Connell, No-Fault Auto Insurance: Back By Popular (Market) Demand?, 26
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 993, 997-1001 (1989).
10. The Florida financial responsibility statute requires covered motorists to
purchase liability insurance with limits of $10,000 for the bodily injury or death of a
person; of $20,000 for two or more persons; and of $5000 for property damage. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 324.021 (West Supp. 1989).
11. The Florida Constitution provides an impenetrable barrier against tort claims
as follows:
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no
judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment
of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the purchase, im-
provement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other
labor performed on the realty, the following property owned by the head of a
family:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of one hun-
dred sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements thereon, which shall not
be reduced without the owner's consent by reason of subsequent inclusion in a
municipality; or if located within a municipality, to the extent of one-half acre
of contiguous land, upon which the exemption shall be limited to the residence
of the owner or his family;
(2) personal property to the value of one thousand dollars.
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
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poorest class of NF purchasers under the OJ plan (which probably
extends well into the bottom tiers of the middle class) would see a
net rise in the amounts they pay for motor vehicle insurance. Finally,
and this is the hidden zinger in the OJ plan as to the poorest among
us, in choosing the NF option at an elevated price, the poor people
would also be choosing to give up all the rights to both noneconomic
and economic damages that they have under existing tort law. In
other words, the vaunted choices in the OJ plan omit two valuable
choices, either of which would be preferable to people in this class:
retain the present system and purchase more no-fault benefits, or re-
tain the present system and spend their money exactly as they now
are spending it. In short, this fabulous freedom of choice plan limits
rather than creates choices, and the ones it takes away are prefera-
ble to the ones it offers.
Things could come out even worse for the poorer classes. If, for
example, the minimum tort coverage were set low enough, the price
of that coverage might prove to be less than the price of the aug-
mented NF coverage. If so, the poorest people, and maybe others
too, could be lured into buying into that plan to save money. In do-
ing so, they would be abandoning all no-fault coverage, which they
ought to have, and buying liability coverage which they don't need at
all. And on top of it, the amount of liability coverage they buy would
simultaneously cap their tort rights (except as against a Tort in-
sured, such as myself, with higher limits). Hence, the OJ plan might
well drive many of the poorest people into making a perverse choice
indeed.
By a similar analysis I can demonstrate that the OJ plan would
put the people in the middle in a quandary. People in this class may
have some nonhomestead assets (or prospects of acquiring them)
they want protected, and carry some liability insurance 12 in addition
to the required PIP coverages. Moreover, many are aware of the risk
of catastrophic injuries in a highway crash and some carry modest
amounts of uninsured motorist coverage to guard against the conse-
quences. What would they do under the OJ plan? It is all a specula-
tive matter, of course, but I would guess the less well off of this
group would opt for NF and suffer the same losses as the poorest.
Perhaps most of these would see a net reduction in total insurance
payments (i.e., they would drop liability and uninsured motorist cov-
erages but increase NF coverages), but others would see a net in-
crease (particularly those presently with no or low limit liability cov-
erage and with no uninsured motorist coverage). I would guess that
most of these folks would just as soon choose the present system.
The OJ plan might offer the people in the higher tiers of the mid-
12. See generally supra note 11.
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dle bracket a genuine opportunity to lower their motor vehicle insur-
ance bills. If they opt for NF, the net price might truly be less than
the sum of their current PIP, liability, and uninsured motorist cover-
ages. Nevertheless, giving up tort recoveries in the event of a cata-
strophic automobile injury would nag at them, and some might
purchase additional coverages. If so, their gains would be offset. All
the NF purchasers would, of course, give up the right to recover in
tort from those who are able and otherwise potentially liable to pay.
The people in the group just below me-say those now buying lia-
bility and uninsured motorist coverages in the amount of $300,000
per person-would have a hard choice. They could probably save
money on insurance premiums by taking the NF option (at least if
they did not add on additional coverages) but many would want to
keep their tort rights intact. Perhaps they could still save money by
buying $300,000 Tort coverage under the OJ plan (because of their
immunity to the NF insureds) but this would not be a satisfactory
replacement. For one thing, this option would give them no PIP ben-
efits, so they would add first party coverage, thus reducing their sav-
ings. In addition, their tort entitlement would now be capped at
$300,000 except against other Tort insureds (like myself) who have
purchased higher liability limits. Hence, those choosing this option
might raise their liability limits (say to $500,000 or even one million
dollars), thereby further reducing their savings.
In sum, the OJ freedom to choose plan would cost the poorest
people more money (albeit providing them more no-fault benefits)
and would deprive them of the preferable choices they now have
open to them. It might also perversely coerce the poorest people to
opt into the emasculated (for them) tort system, eliminating their
current no-fault coverages and drastically reducing their tort rights.
By contrast, the most well-to-do people could reap a real savings in
insurance premiums because of the immunity against suits brought
by the NF insureds which the OJ plan forces the NF insureds to
"choose." These savings would be diminished, of course, if the well-
to-do people prefer to buy back the tort rights (as I would) that the
OJ plan would otherwise take away from them. Finally, the people
in the middle would have the hardest choices, balancing the prospect
of some immediate reduction in insurance rates and the loss of tort
rights against buying back some part of existing rights at a higher
price.
What I have said should reveal that I am no fan of the OJ plan.
Although it might well take most noneconomic damages out of the
1023
insurance system, it would do so at great expense to the poorer strata
of the population. But these criticisms are merely economic. More
principledly, I think any plan that allows people to opt out of per-
sonal accountability for wrongful acts is wrong. Indeed, one person's
opting out of liability is a denial of another person's rights under the
law of torts. Although I will not examine the matter here, I suspect
any statute having such an effect would be unconstitutional in the
many states, such as Florida, 13 where attempts to place caps on
noneconomic damages (much less abolish them and cap economic
damages as the OJ plan would do) have been thwarted on constitu-
tional grounds. The so-called freedom of choice aspect of the plan is
but a too clever gambit and will be seen as such. What may not be
done directly, may not be done indirectly,' 4 so the plan will (and
should) fail.
PART II-SEMIWORKABLE IDEAS
In this part I will set forth a few semiworkable ideas that might
work. I call the ideas "semiworkable" because the most aggressive is
probably unattainable, the next most aggressive has its own objec-
tionable aspects, and the least objectionable (which is, so far as I
know, a novel wrinkle to well-known ideas) will not produce deep
enough cuts in costs to satisfy OJ proponents. The first of these is
merely a counter no-fault proposal that O'Connell and Joost would
probably endorse if they thought it would get accepted. The latter
two proposals grew out of the work of a 1986-88 Florida Academic
Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems (Aca-
demic Task Force) which I participated in as a member of the aca-
demic research group.
A. More Aggressive No-Fault
I accept the OJ economic premise that shifting claims away from
the tort system into a first party system can reduce the cost of insur-
ance. 5 To that I add this premise: If the legislature perceives a pub-
lic benefit in limiting tort liability that is great enough to offset the
concomitant losses in individual responsibility and common law rem-
edies, then it should apply the new rule to all. Any idea of permit-
ting some people to choose to opt out is repugnant and should be
13. See Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
14. This mimics the well-settled rule that what a constitution prohibits being done
directly cannot be done indirectly. See, e.g., Department of Revenue v. Leadership
Hous., Inc., 343 So. 2d 611, 617 (Fla.) (Roberts, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
805 (1977).
15. My empirical evaluation of the immediate effects of introducing no-fault in
Florida supports this. See Little, An Effect of the Florida Automobile .Reparations Re-
form Act: An Empirical Examination, 9 J. L. REFORM 1 (1976).
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abandoned.
With these premises in mind, I propose this system.
1. All motorists would be required to purchase NF coverage for
PIP benefits up to a high limit, say, $50,000. A NF insured
tortfeasor would be immune as to PIP losses payable from this
source.
2. A no-fault noneconomic damages threshold, like the one in
Florida, would be retained or instituted.
3. A new tort threshold of $50,000 (or whatever the NF limit is)
as to all tort bodily injury damages, both economic and
noneconomic, would be instituted.
4. Liability and uninsured motorist coverages would be offered for
liabilities in excess of the $50,000 floor up to any limit a purchaser
chooses to buy.
The third proposal is new. It is a barrier to recovery and not to
suit. Thus, a plaintiff who brought a suit, satisfied a noneconomic
damages threshold, and obtained a verdict of $100,000, of which
$30,000 was economic and $70,000 noneconomic, would recover a
judgment of $50,000. Indeed, it would not matter how the verdict
was divided between economic and noneconomic losses, as long as
the verdict was $100,000, the judgment would be $50,000 in every
case. I predict this plan would squeeze a mass of noneconomic losses
out of the insurance system (to be internalized by the victims) and
should reduce the amount of litigation and concurrent expenses. It
would not offer any trick choices and it would not benefit the rich at
the expense of the poor.
As to the poorest population, the required NF coverage would
raise their insurance costs, as does the OJ plan, but it would not
tempt any of them to opt into a liability plan that would offer them
nothing. Indeed, persons in this category would be best off not to buy
liability insurance. At the same time, they would retain all the com-
mon law rights in tort except for the $50,000 threshold.
The middle and upper classes would probably save some money.
The lower middle class should also opt solely for NF, thereby offset-
ting the cost of the added NF coverage by dropping liability cover-
age. People in the middle and higher categories would retain liability
and uninsured motorist coverages, but their entire insurance pack-
ages should cost somewhat less because of the noneconomic losses
squeezed out of the entire system by the uniform $50,000 threshold
operating on top of the typical noneconomic damages NF threshold.
This plan I offer as a direct alternative, free of tricks. Two barri-
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ers stand in the way of enactment: political acceptability and consti-
tutional prohibitions against infringing common law rights. I offer no
"freedom to choose" smoke screen on the former point; the plan will
have to stand on its merits. Moreover, I believe the plan would pass
constitutional muster under the analysis courts have applied to work-
ers' compensation1 6 and the initial round of no-fault plans, 7 but I
will not examine the issue here.
B. Prompt Resolution of Meritorious Claims
What to do about skyrocketing medical malpractice insurance
rates was a major item on the agenda of the Academic Task Force.
Preliminary studies showed increasing payments and increasing costs
of defending claims were major factors driving the perceived crisis. 8
(Another was the driving force of the so-called insurance cycle.'9)
16. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 196-200 (1917).
17. I confess that Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), poses an obstacle to
this plan, but if the public need is great enough, it could be surmounted.
18. ACADEMIC TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INSURANCE AND TORT SYSTEMS,
PRELIMINARY FACT-FINDING REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1987).
19. The Academic Task Force provided the following description of the underwrit-
ing cycle:
The phenomenon known as the "underwriting cycle" is unique to the insur-
ance industry and is a major cause of the periodic malpractice insurance crises.
An entire cycle is defined by the period of years in which insurer underwriting
profits cycle from above average to below average. Such cycles have always
been a feature of the insurance industry and this is especially true for medical
malpractice liability insurance, which generates large loss reserves for
investment.
1. Causes of Underwriting Cycles. Economic cycles usually result from
changes in demand but, since the demand for insurance is rather constant, the
insurance underwriting cycle results from changes in supply.
The cycle may begin when insurance is very profitable and, as a result, capi-
tal flows into the industry as new insurance companies are formed. To attract
business, the new companies cut rates forcing the existing companies to cut
rates in order to protect their market share. The rate cutting continues until
the underwriting losses exceed the amount that insurers are willing to bear. At
that point, some insurers will withdraw from the marketplace, some because of
insolvency and others voluntarily. This shrinkage in supply permits the remain-
ing insurers to raise rates to more profitable levels. The rate increases come
quickly, and usually are accompanied by tighter underwriting standards, which
result in more frequent refusals by insurers to provide insurance. The higher
rates restore profitability, which attracts new capital into the marketplace, and
a new cycle begins.
Effect of Interest Rates on Underwriting Cycle
Underwriting cycles are frequently, but not always, driven by changes in
interest rates. In addition, interest rates may prolong an underwriting cycle.
The most recent cycle (the longest in history) was probably influenced by both
types of effect.
The historically high interest rates which peaked in 1981 permitted substan-
tial rate deductions or, at least, a delay in rate increases as insurers competed
for premium dollars to invest. As interest rates declined, premium increases
became necessary to offset the effect of reduced investment income.
Id. at 89-90.
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Although the doctors were pushing hard for it, the Academic Task
Force refused to recommend any form of immunity or direct
noneconomic damage limitation. 0 Instead, the Academic Task Force
was persuaded the litigation process itself was out of control and
could be tamed to provide major overall savings. 1 The evidence
showed defendants seldom get serious about negotiating with plain-
tiffs until a trial date is set. Moreover, plaintiffs too often file mal-
practice lawsuits before obtaining careful expert review of whether
malpractice was the probable cause of the harm.
What emerged was a "Prompt Resolution of Meritorious Medical
Negligence Claims Plan" (PR Plan) of two parts.2 The first part
requires the intending plaintiff, as a condition of bringing suit, to
inform an intended malpractice defendant of an intention to file suit
prior to bringing the action2" and to include with the notice a written
opinion of an expert "corroborating" the claim of negligent injury. 24
Similarly, as a condition of denying the claim, the PR plan requires
defendants to submit to the plaintiff an expert opinion refuting medi-
cal negligence. 25 These preliminaries are intended to force both par-
ties to evaluate the claim earlier rather than later.
The second stage of the plan is intended to offer the parties eco-
nomic inducements to enter into voluntary, but binding arbitration.
The financial gain to the insurance system would come from limita-
tions on noneconomic damages and from a cheaper resolution
process.
Here is how the arbitration plan works. Either party can demand
binding arbitration with the following possible outcomes:
1. The Parties Arbitrate: The defendant pays the plaintiff full eco-
nomic damages, noneconomic damages up to a maximum of
$250,000, and reasonable attorneys fees. A three-member arbitration
panel makes the nonreviewable (absent fraud, for instance) findings.
2. Neither Party Demands Arbitration: The parties proceed to
trial under the existing law of torts.
20. Id. at 2.
21. Except for the limited but important instance of catastrophic injuries to infants
suffered in the birthing process. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.303 (West Supp. 1989) (pro-
viding a no-fault plan for tightly defined neonatal injuries).
22. ACADEMIC TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INSURANCE AND TORT SYSTEMS,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS (1987) [hereinafter MALPRACTICE
RECOMMENDATIONS].
23. Id. at 16.
24. Notice of intent to sue, but without the expert opinion, was already required in
Florida. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.57(2) (West 1986).
25. MALPRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 18-19.
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3. The Plaintiff Demands Arbitration and the Defendant Declines:
The parties proceed to trial under the existing law of torts, modified
to award a successful plaintiff prejudgment interest on the recovery
and a reasonable attorney's fee.
4. The Defendant Demands Arbitration and the Plaintiff Declines:
The parties proceed to trial under the existing law of torts, modified
to cap noneconomic damage recoveries to $350,000.6
The Florida legislature enacted a slightly modified version of the
plan into law and it now regulates medical malpractice actions. 7
Obviously, should the plan prove effective, it could be extended to
the general run of tort actions, including automobile negligence
cases.
I personally do not much like the induced arbitration part of the
plan and doubt if it will deliver enough benefits to give it transfera-
bility. To begin with, the PR plan is infected with a perversity that is
reminiscent of the OJ plan. To my way of thinking, it plainly favors
defendants. As I see it, defendants should always demand arbitration
in cases of strong liability and severe damages and should always
refuse to arbitrate in cases of iffy liability and moderate or small
damages. Hence, strong plaintiffs would usually see their
noneconomic damages capped ($250,000 if they arbitrate and
$350,000 if they do not), and weak plaintiffs would usually be forced
to trial. If I am correct in my perception of the imbalance here, the
Florida Supreme Court will give a very hard look at the constitution-
ality of the scheme under existing tort limitation jurisprudence.28
I am also doubtful that the induced arbitration scheme, if consti-
tutional, will achieve the intended economic benefits. Of the four
possible outcomes only number one (arbitration) and number four
(plaintiff declines arbitration) offer any prospect of savings. Out-
come number two (neither party demands arbitration) is neutral and
number three (defendant refuses arbitration) could actually add
costs in cases won by plaintiffs. Nevertheless, time will tell. If my
earlier prediction that defendants regularly demand arbitration in
bad (for them) cases is correct, the PR plan may squeeze some real
money out of the medical malpractice insurance system.
C. Mandated Demand for Judgment Plan
I invented the Mandated Demand for Judgment Plan (MD Plan)
as an alternative to the PR plan, which I didn't like. This is the way
it works. First, in the medical malpractice setting the same prerequi-
sites to filing and denying suits that were described under the PR
26. Id. at 15-27.
27. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.102-.316 (West Supp. 1989).
28. See, e.g., Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
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plan could be adopted. Thereafter, the MD plan would force the par-
ties into early settlement negotiations as follows:
1. After filing suit, the plaintiff must make a demand for judg-
ment against each defendant within ninety days of the date the ac-
tion began.
(a) The demand must be filed with the court and becomes a
part of the record of the suit.
(b) If the plaintiff does not file the demand, the defendant may
file a motion to dismiss and the action shall be dismissed with a right
of the plaintiff to replead if and only if the action is not otherwise
banned by operation of law. A second dismissal for failure to make a
demand shall be a dismissal with prejudice.2 9
(c) No case in which the demand is not made will be permitted
to go to trial.-3
2. If the demand is not accepted and the litigation continues to the
point that the plaintiff has obtained a final and binding verdict:
(a) If the amount of the verdict exceeds the amount of the
plaintiff's unaccepted demand, the defendant shall be required to
pay the amount of the verdict plus interest computed at the rate of
eighteen percent per annum compounded on the amount of the plain-
tiff's demand for judgment beginning at the date the demand was
made as determined by the court record;
(b) But if the amount of the verdict is less than the amount of
the plaintiffs unaccepted demand, the defendant shall pay the ver-
dict, less all the reasonable fees, costs, and expenses accrued by the
defendant in defending the case after the date the demand was
made. These reductions shall be made before any computation or
payment of a fee for plaintiffs lawyer is made.
3. At any time within ninety days of the date of plaintiffs de-
mand, the defendant may make a counteroffer and file it in the rec-
ord of the litigation. If the counteroffer is not accepted and the liti-
gation continues to the point that the plaintiff has obtained a verdict
and if the amount of the verdict exceeds the amount of the plaintiff's
unaccepted demand, the sum on which the plaintiff shall be entitled
to receive interest shall be the amount of the plaintiffs demand mi-
nus the amount of the defendant's offer, beginning at the date the
demand was made as determined by the court record. If the action is
29. This sentence is new. It is intended to deny plaintiffs the discretion to indefi-
nitely put off making a demand.
30. This part is new. It is intended to prevent plaintiffs and defendants from agree-
ing sub silentio to ignore the demand process.
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against joint and several tortfeasors, the amount of the offer shall be
the sum of valid independent and separate offers and the liability for
interests on the difference between the demand and the offer shall be
a joint and several liability. No defendant shall be required to make
a settlement counteroffer.'
4. (a) The plaintiff may make a series of demands within the 180-
day period succeeding the date of the first demand with each new
demand revoking its predecessor. After the expiration of the 180-day
period, the plaintiff may make no new demands for the purpose of
invoking the operation of the plan, except that the plaintiff may
make one additional demand in the ten-day period immediately fol-
lowing the 180th day if the defendant makes a counteroffer on the
180th day or the plaintiff first learns of such a counteroffer on the
180th day.
(b) The defendant may make a series of counteroffers during
the 180-day period succeeding the date of the plaintiff's initial de-
mand with each new demand revoking its predecessors. After the
expiration of the 180-day period, the defendant may make no new
counter-offer for the purpose of invoking the operation of the plan.32
This plan is intended to induce an early and sincere dialogue
about settlement. Plaintiffs must open the negotiations and do so
knowing that unrealistically high demands will cost them money.
(The majority of the Academic Task Force research group thought
that the threatened cost to plaintiffs was too small.33) Defendants
can choose to sit on their hands, but would do so at the risk of sub-
stantial additional costs.34 Because most actions have some legiti-
mate settlement value (especially with the filing prerequisites de-
scribed above), defendants should ordinarily respond with a
counteroffer. Once this occurs, the process will have begun and
might often lead to a settlement.
If these inducements work, cases which can be settled should be
settled earlier than they now are, thereby saving costs. I have a
hunch the settlement amounts would tend to be less than courthouse
door settlements and jury awards. The downside risk, so far as costs
is concerned, is that some cases plaintiffs would otherwise lose at
trial might settle and, if defendants systematically offered too little,
31. This sentence is new and is added merely to make explicit what was implicitly
intended. ACADEMIC TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INSURANCE AND TORT SYSTEMS,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS OF RESEARCH STAFF 16 (1987) [hereinafter
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS OF RESEARCH STAFF].
32. This subpart has been rewritten to provide greater flexibility.
33. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS OF RESEARCH STAFF, supra note
31, at 16. The majority also criticized the MD plan as not providing "sufficient predict-
ability for those who evaluate expected loss payments." Id.
34. If the 18% interest from the date of demand were thought too little to be an
incentive, it could be substantially helped by making it run from the date of the injury.
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the interest surcharge would actually drive up costs.
The MP plan is transferable to all tort litigation. I believe it would
lower insurance costs enough to make a difference. But beyond that,
if properly attended to by the judges and defense concerns, it could
help bring the unruly litigation process under control. It would not
and should not make defendants settle worthless cases or give in to
unrealistic demands, but it should make them undertake determined
settlement efforts early. The one thing it lacks is an element for pe-
nalizing plaintiffs (or their lawyers) who prosecute worthless cases to
losses before juries. Maybe someone else can think of how to do that,
but I doubt there are enough of these cases to make much difference
in the cost of insurance.
SUMMARY
The OJ plan is a trick. The so-called freedom to choose is illusory
and benefits the rich at the expense of the poor. A beefed up no-fault
plan with an added level of immunity for all would be preferable on
several counts. Beyond renewed no-fault efforts, various plans that
would induce early settlement attempts could be beneficial both in
bringing tort litigation under control and in reducing costs.
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